Terrorist activity in Trans-Sahel region of Africa remains a challenge to U.S. national security. Under the Obama administration, soft power became a core principle of his foreign policy strategy. The question I present in this thesis is how the U.S. government, specifically the Department of State, infuses soft power into the foreign arena to achieve its strategic goals and under what conditions can public diplomacy be an effective instrument of U.S. power.A country's soft power rests on its resources of ideas, values, and policies. The soft power methods available to the Department of State are limited if one utilizes a traditional definition of soft power. I propose that if one modifies the traditional definition of soft power to include training and foreign aid, the Department can and does effectively utilize soft power in the Trans-Sahel region of Africa. By reinforcing existing, and implementing new soft power "plus" programs (e.g. the use of influence, training and foreign aid) in the Trans Sahel, the U.S. will continue to effect long-term substantive changes and build potential partners in the region thus effectively countering extremist ideology and accomplish its foreign policy objectives.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Many have heard the axiom "you can kill a person but you cannot kill an idea." So the question I present in this paper is how does the U.S. government, specifically the Department of State, infuse "ideas" into the foreign arena to achieve its strategic goals and under what conditions can public diplomacy be an effective instrument of U.S. power? The soft power methods available to the Department of State are limited if one utilizes a traditional definition of "soft power." However, expanding the definition of soft power to incorporate training and foreign aid demonstrates the Department of State can and does effectively utilize soft power in the Trans-Sahel region to accomplish its U.S. foreign policy objectives in spite of the negative press from the region. My objective with this paper is to move the conversation to a deeper level of review and analysis in concrete and specific ways. I will discuss the Department's soft-power strategy in the Trans-Sahel, follow with specific instances State uses soft power "plus," present some implications of the use of soft power "plus," and conclude with several U.S. Strategic Policy Recommendations.