If I were to say that Japan had a formula (and a viable one at that) for victory in World War II, what sort of reaction would I get? Perhaps most people would be dismissive, wondering how I could be suffering from such a delusion at this late date. Certainly most citizens of the Western world would react that way.



History professor James B. Wood of Williams College sums up Western thinking regarding this topic in his book Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable?, stating:



“Why were the Japanese so crazy as to take on the United States?” or “How could a country with a GNP about that of Italy or Canada, expect to win?” or “Why should we expect anything else from a country with a feudal warrior code and culture, emperor worship, racial supremacy notions, and a total lack of sympathy or respect for her neighbors?” The implication is that those responsible for Japan’s path to war were ignorant or irrational, perhaps a blend of both, as well as basically evil - a perfectly other counterpoise to the victor of modernity in all respect, the United States. However, the extremely dismissive view of Westerners has no basis. Japanese leaders were not at all “ignorant”.



On November 15, 1941, three weeks prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese government and Imperial General Headquarters held a liaison conference. Those present discussed the “Draft Proposal for the Promotion of the End of the War Against the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Chiang Kai-shek,” and decided on its execution. I consider this the “master plan”, a plan for victory, and I will lead readers though this with the aid of practical examples throughout my book.

Had Japanese military leaders stuck to this master plan, the outcome of the war would have been very different, an outcome that Winston Churchill feared in his April 15, 1942 letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt:



I must revert to the grave situation in the Indian Ocean … arising from the fact that the Japanese have felt able to detach nearly a third of their battle fleet and half their carriers, which force we are unable to match for several months. The consequences of this may easily be: (A) The loss of Ceylon. (B) Invasion of Eastern India with incalculable internal consequences to our whole war plan and including the loss of Calcutta and of all contact with the Chinese through Burma. But this is only the beginning. Until we are able to fight a fleet action there is no reason why the Japanese should not become the dominating factor in the Western Indian Ocean. This would result in the collapse of our whole position in the Middle East, not only because of the interruption to our convoys to the Middle East and India, but also because of the interruptions to the oil supplies from Abadan, without which we cannot maintain our position either at sea or on land in the Indian Ocean Area. Supplies to Russia via the Persian Gulf would also be cut. With so much of the weight of Japan thrown upon us we have more than we can bear. (Kimball, Warren, ed., Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, vol. 1, Alliance Emerging (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)

本書は、第二次世界大戦における日本の敗北を「必然」と断ずる西洋的な歴史観に対し、緻密な史料批判をもって真っ向から挑む知的冒険譚です。茂木弘道氏は、当時の指導層が共有していた「対米英蘭蒋戦争終結促進に関する腹案」を、単なる未完の計画ではなく、冷徹な合理性に基づいた「勝利の方程式」として鮮やかに再定義しています。 チャーチルの書簡を引き合いに、インド洋での制海権喪失がいかに連合国の崩壊を招き得たかを解き明かす筆致は、歴史の「もしも」を超えた、国家存亡のリアリズムを突きつけます。偏見の霧を払い、敗者の側に存在した高度な戦略思考を掘り下げる本作は、我々が知る「正史」の裏側に潜む巨大な可能性の深淵を覗かせてくれる、極めて刺激的な一冊です。