This is the second of two thoroughly researched and well documented volumes on the Rogue River Indian War, 1851-56. The Oregon Superintendency of Indian Affairs under Joel Palmer and the Army's Captain Andrew Smith of Fort Lane greatly misunderstood and underestimated the Native Americans and consequently misinformed General John Wool, commanding the Department of the Pacific. Chief Tecumtum had planned and coordinated with tribal leaders throughout the Pacific Northwest the nearly simultaneous outbreak of war in three distinct theaters beginning in October 1855. This volume focuses on just one--the Rogue River Indian War, the various campaigns with another 42 battles and engagements.The army, the territorial governor, and the frontiersmen were confronted with a myriad of challenges but failed to respond with unity of action and purpose resulting in wasted resources, but more importantly culminating in lives lost and the destruction of property. The author analyzes and evaluates the operational and tactical planning and execution of the war by leaders of the U.S. Army, the Oregon volunteers, as well as by the native chiefs. Two of the battles during this war resulted in more casualties than any other war in the Pacific Northwest: the first being a Native American victory and the second being won by the U.S. Army. For the natives, they would reap the whirlwind for their leaders' decisions. They would lose their homelands, their culture, and for many--their lives.This volume has 399 pages, 31 photographs, and 14 maps, 13 of which are in color.